Volume 33

Number 3

Article 1

March 2005

Can Christianity Engage Consumer Capitalism?
John R. Schneider

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege
Part of the Christianity Commons

Recommended Citation
Schneider, John R. (2005) "Can Christianity Engage Consumer
Capitalism?," Pro Rege: Vol. 33: No. 3, 1 - 14.
Available at: https://digitalcollections.dordt.edu/pro_rege/vol33/iss3/1

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University Publications at Dordt Digital
Collections. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pro Rege by an authorized administrator of Dordt Digital
Collections. For more information, please contact ingrid.mulder@dordt.edu.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Schneider developed this paper from a pair of lectures delivered
on March 8, 2004, at the Dordt College Science and Technology Center.

Can Christianity Engage
Consumer Capitalism?

by John R. Schneider

The “New Things” of Capitalism
The problem of relating the Christian faith to
the world of economic life is not new. As H.
Richard Niebuhr wrote in his classic work Christ
and Culture, the problem of “God and mammon”
is as old as Christianity itself. It is one of those
“perennial” problems that every generation of
Christians must face (Niebuhr, 1951). However,
the ancient species of the ancient problem has
changed.
In 1891, Pope Leo XIII published his monumental encyclical, Rerum Novarum, “Of New
Things.” He used the phrase in reference to draDr. John R. Schneider is Professor of Religion and
Theology at Calvin College. He has authored three
books on the topic of Christianity and wealth, including his most recent, The Good of Affluence: Seeing
God in a Culture of Wealth.

matic changes that many of the “perennial”
Christian questions had undergone during the
great revolutions of modernity. Changes in the
political, intellectual, and economic orders of
society had thrown the church into crisis. Not
since the first centuries of Christianity had so
many new “wineskins” been needed all at once to
contain the “new wine” of the larger culture (Leo
XIII, 1991[1891].
It is fair to say that Christianity has done well
in catching up with the “new things” brought
forth by the orders of democracy and science.
While debates still rage over one issue or another,
we have rethought our inherited traditions on
government and science, and we have (more or
less) made the difficult transition into the new age
of Jefferson and Darwin.
However, we have not done quite so well at
keeping pace with change in the economic order.
We have made some progress, to be sure. In his
encyclical, Leo was prescient enough to understand that the economic order of state socialism,
which many church theologians had begun to
embrace, was in its essence contrary to both
nature and basic Christian principles, such as the
dignity of the individual and the goodness of
property. Likewise, he also understood that the
new order of capitalism, despite the new social
evils that came with it, was in principle
redeemable and, with the help of Christianity,
could become an imperfect means of grace to
both church and world.
In the century and more since he wrote the
encyclical, still “newer things” came forth from
capitalism amid the Great Depression and the two
World Wars, and we now seem unsure what to do
with capitalism. It seems that we face a dilemma.
On the one hand, as Francis Fukuyama has
written in his book The End of History, advocates
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of democratic capitalism have prevailed in the
long and bitter war of ideology with defenders of
state socialism (Fukuyama, 1992). The war was
won less on paper than in the trenches of real economic life. For state socialism failed almost
everywhere it was tried. In contrast, in the last
fifty years free-market systems have displayed
astonishing success—at least in many places. In
twenty nations or more, literal poverty is all but
eliminated, and average people live better than
kings did not very long ago. In consequence,
moral discourse now includes an extraordinary
“new thing.” It includes serious hope that the
poor might not always be with us, that the evils of
poverty might one day be banished from the
earth.
On the other hand, however, when we look
more deeply, and with distinctly Christian eyes,
we see that the triumph of capitalism has also created a “new” danger. Agreement is now widespread among Christian intellectuals that capitalism is our best hope for helping the world’s poor.
As a result, there is growing support for accepting
capitalism as an economic system (Gay, 1991, pp.
22-63). However, the great majority of Christian
theologians, philosophers, and social theorists are
very reluctant to embrace capitalism as a human
culture. For capitalism is no mere wealth-churning “system.” In Michael Novak’s phrase, it is a
“way of life” (Novak, 1982, p. 29).
Many and various reasons exist for this
ambivalence toward capitalism, in spite of its success. One of them is the damage that societies of
capitalism have done to nature. I have given my
theologian’s perspective on this problem elsewhere, and (important as it is) I choose to ignore
it here (Schneider, 2002, pp. 49-56). In this essay,
my focus is rather on the problem that we have
come to know as “materialism,” as it is manifest
in so-called “consumerism.” The problem is not
unique to Christianity, but it is particularly
intense and vexing for Christians who are serious
about their faith. This intensity and vexation are
rooted in two sources: (1) the nature of our historic tradition, and (2) the nature of the economic
culture as it has evolved in recent decades.
As for our historic tradition, the vast majority
of the Church Fathers judged that the deliberate
acquisition and enjoyment of material wealth,
beyond what was necessary for one’s proper
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function in the world, was morally perverse and
rebellious against God. This critique consists of
two elements, which tend to go together. On the
one hand, the Church Fathers judged that because
such economic habits were indications of bad
personal character, they were considered vicious
in any circumstances. Consider the argument of
St. Augustine. Augustine (354-430) made a sharp
philosophical distinction between the “use”
(usus) and the “enjoyment” (fruitio) of finite
goods: It is in the nature of finite goods that we
ought to value them, but only as instruments that
are supposed to serve the greater infinite goods of
God. It is simply in their nature that we should
not “enjoy” them. Fascinating debates exist
among experts over exactly what Augustine
meant by this distinction (Mathewes, 2004, pp.
201-216). Nevertheless, the larger idea seems
clear enough. We are to value things like food
mainly for sustenance, sex for procreation, clothing and shelter for protection, and so forth. The
mandate is not ascetic, but it is temperate. As I
understand Augustine, the mandate is for properly tempered degrees of passion, and the prohibition is strongly against intemperance, flights of
passion into excess, and extravagance (p. 208).
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), following
Aristotle, praised moderation as a rule for all
virtue. Using this rule, he judged that we might
indeed use material goods for ourselves—even
enjoy some pleasures “for health’s sake”—but
only to meet our true “needs.” Aquinas understood “needs” to be “everything we must have in
order to survive decently.” To the degree that
immoderation rules, we are no different from the
beasts (Aquinas, 1998, p. 427 [II.141.7]).
In Christian history, one is hard pressed to find
any major theologian who takes issue with the
general counsel of temperance and moderation,
so understood in terms of true “need.” Right or
wrong, this understanding of the Christian economic life creates nearly insuperable difficulties
for Christians who wish to accept capitalism for
its utility and take part in its culture (Gordon,
1989). For with capitalism, the economic culture
has changed in ways that make it almost completely incompatible with this historic mandate of
temperance.
A century ago this year, social historian Max
Weber first adumbrated the problem in his monu-

mental work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism (1904). This work is most famous
for its explanation of the origins of capitalism.
Weber believed that the “worldly asceticism” of
American Puritanism produced the new economic order. Few scholars today accept this theory
without criticism. However, in this great work,
Weber also offered a second judgment that still
stands almost uncontested. The human culture
that inevitably (so he believed) grew from capitalism became for these Christians a stahlhartes
Gehäuse: The standard translation is “iron cage,”
but a better rendering probably is “shell, as hard
as steel.” This concept continues the thought of
Richard Baxter’s metaphor. As Weber notes,
Baxter urged his flock to wear the material life of
capitalism as if it were a “light cloak” (Weber,
1965 [1904], p.188). Instead, it became an impenetrable enclosure, letting the spirit of the true faith
neither in nor out.
In our day, with the emergence of consumer
capitalism, the problem only seems worse. Its
very nature as a working economic system is to
be a veritable culture of acquisition and enjoyment of innumerable goods beyond the pale of
“necessity,” even if we define necessity with the
nuances that Aquinas gave the term. The culture
of consumer capitalism is just (among other
things) a culture of passions for excess and
extravagance of the sort that Christianity has typically condemned. Unless we forge a theology
and ethics for affirming these passions and habits,
we have no basis for participating in the culture,
no matter how great its utility as an economic system. In the last part of this essay, I will propose a
broad framework for such a theology and ethics,
and will extend certain arguments that I gave in
my book The Good of Affluence (Schneider,
2002).
First, however, I wish to spend some time dealing with yet another vexing moral problem that
has come with consumer capitalism. Beside the
new challenges to personal virtue as traditionally
understood, the new economic order poses very
great challenges to our understanding of the
social virtue of justice.
In historic tradition, nearly all the Christian
authorities in history have condemned the enjoyment of goods, past necessity, as being intemperate and morally weak. They have condemned

such enjoyment even more severely when it
occurs amid the poverty of others. Christian theologians have been nearly unanimous in judging
enjoyment in those circumstances to be a very
grave form of injustice against one’s neighbor,
akin to robbery and murder (Augustine, 1834, p.
42).
Aquinas went so far as to propose that in circumstances of dire need, everything becomes
“common property” if none will help. Not only
do the prosperous people have an obligation to
give, but the poor person “is [also] entitled to take
what he needs from others” (p. 363 [II. 32. 7]).
Once again, it is hard to find any serious disagreement in Christian moral teaching with the principles of social justice in these works (Gonzalez,
1990).
However, our economic culture has brought
forth the “new thing” that we call “globalization.”
Globalization is a new order of connections
between the nations of the world. Within this new
order, we are made more aware than ever of the
great disparity between the wealth of some
nations and the poverty of other nations. The new
question is this: what are the moral obligations of
people in affluent societies to the millions of
human beings worldwide who live in poverty? In
the light of the historic Christian tradition, it
seems that the common lifestyle of consumer
capitalism does grave injustice to our neighbors,
now understood globally. If so, that injustice is
very serious to our general Christian assessment
of participation in the culture. For as Stanley
Hauerwas has written, “Capitalism’s ability to
produce great wealth is irrelevant as rebuttal to
the essential injustice of capitalism” (Hauerwas,
1998, p. 219). One might as well defend the
Mafia for its ability to create wealth, as it does,
and on that basis encourage a life in organized
crime as a Christian vocation.
We desperately need clear Christian principles
for handling this global question and the others. As
Christine Hinze observes, we have taken some
steps in the right direction, such as in the encyclical, Centennimus Annus, by John Paul II (1991).
Still, there is a great deal more work to do in forging a theology and ethics with which to engage the
world of consumer capitalism as a realm of proper
Christian vocation (Hinze, 2004, p.174). I have
come to believe that our vexation is in part due to
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our historic tradition. I have come to believe that a
theology and ethic cannot very well be adapted to
the new realities of capitalism without considerable rethinking and revision. And on the whole,
that is what Christian theorists have been trying to
do. Perhaps the most impressive philosophical
work on consumerism is that of Catholic writer,
John Ryan. Before World War II, Ryan made a systematic effort to apply the Thomistic counsel of
temperance to our ethics of modern economic life
(Hinze, 2004). Others seek to adapt Augustine’s
doctrine of “use” to modern capitalism (Mathewes,
2004). These works are well worth reading and
considering. However, I do not think that any of
them show quite clearly enough just how embedded in modern economic cultures the experience of
excess is. If we think about it, intemperance (as
classically defined) is inherent in these cultures—
it is part of what makes them work. Since it is, I
believe we require new hermeneutical “wineskins,” much as we did in order to handle the “new
wine” of modern science.
Before making my own proposals, I wish to
give some space to recent attempts to put modern
Christian economic life in terms of “simpler living.” I think it is important to see that such a strategy is inadequate for providing the Christian
norms we need in order to take part, to engage, in
consumer capitalism with integrity. Unfortunately (so I argue), the arguments for “simpler living”
lead logically to a mandate of disengagement;
thus, they create a distressing moral impasse for
Christians who sincerely wonder what they ought
to do.
Peter Singer: Routine Consumption is Murder
Moral philosopher Peter Singer has formulated
the social problem of modern consumerism as
forcefully as anyone else. Singer is not a
Christian. His metaphysics are those of philosophical naturalism, and his ethics are those of
material utilitarianism, which I will define in just
a moment.
In an interview with the New York Times,
Singer relates a story from a documentary film
about a poor woman from Brazil named Dora
(Singer, 1999, pp. 60-63). Dora hears that some
people in her city are giving a thousand dollars to
anyone who brings an orphan to them, so that
they can give the orphan housing and care. She
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knows a homeless boy, whom she takes to the
stipulated address; there, she receives her thousand dollars—more money than she ever
dreamed of having. Immediately she buys a television and begins enjoying her new luxury. To her
horror, however, as she happily scans the channels, a bulletin comes out warning that a crime
ring is operating in the city. They are abducting
children, taking their organs, and selling them on
the black market. Dora instantly springs into
action. She takes the television back, gets a
refund, and then hastens to the address to redeem
the little boy.
What if she had done otherwise? Singer
observes that North American audiences would
have been sickened by Dora’s immorality had she
simply ignored the bulletin and gone on enjoying
her programs, for she would have put her new
T.V. ahead of the boy’s life and thereby contributed to his death. She would have committed
a grotesque kind of murder. The irony is, so
argues Singer, that North American consumers
are doing that very same thing. They routinely
enjoy luxuries when they could very well use
their resources to save the lives of people elsewhere in the world. In these actions and inactions,
they are unwittingly responsible for the deaths of
those innocent people.
By what moral reckoning or rule does such
consumption count as murderous? For Singer, it
is a rule of strict material utility. Stated in general terms, the rule is that one’s first moral obligation is to meet whatever true material needs it is
within one’s power to meet—first one’s own and
then the needs of others. Note these three provisions: (1) material needs take precedence over
other kinds of need, such as the need for
advanced knowledge or conditions of aesthetic
beauty; (2) all obligations between people have
equal moral strength; i.e., my children or relatives
or next-door neighbors have in principle no
greater hold on my moral life than do people
whom I have not met, who are strangers to me;
and (3) “globalization” has brought it within the
power of people in modern societies to meet the
basic material needs of poor people almost everywhere on earth. Hence, Singer judges that the rule
of material utility is now to be globally understood, and he condemns routine consumption as
murder on a global scale.

The Moral Impasse of “Simpler Living”
Is the rule of strict material utility in keeping
with biblically Christian theology and ethics?
Does it provide the standards we need for
Christian engagement of consumer capitalism?
The most able and influential advocates of “simpler living” seem to think so. First, we will consider the moral argument of Arthur Simon,
founder and President Emeritus of Bread for the
World and author of the book How Much is
Enough? (2003). Then, we will look at the somewhat more detailed proposals of Ronald Sider,
whose book, Rich Christians in an Age of
Hunger, is in its fourth edition (1997) and has
sold over 350,000 copies worldwide. In my view,
there are three compelling reasons that Christians
must resist adoption of this “simpler living” rule.
First, it leads logically to the repudiation of certain essential Christian doctrines and, perforce, to
denunciation of the life of Christ. Second,
attempts to modify the rule, so as to avoid this
supreme absurdity, only prove that this rule cannot regulate a distinctly Christian ethics of consumer capitalism. Third, the attempts both to
assert and to modify the rule lead logically to a
dreadful moral impasse that requires the disengagement of Christians from the culture of modern capitalism.
In his crucial chapter on the ethics of lifestyle,
“Living More Simply That Others May Live,”
Simon makes direct appeal to Peter Singer and
his lesson from the story of Dora. Without criticism, Simon approves Singer’s condemnation of
consumption as murderous. Going for the new
car, enjoying the cruise, redecorating the house,
buying the new suit—all these actions are morally indecent, as Singer contends. Quoting Singer,
to live a “morally decent life…put the life of a
boy ahead of going to fancy restaurants” (Simon,
2003, p.132). Simon continues the appeal:
“Singer’s words are upsetting because they tell
the truth” (p.132). For we know that five hundred
dollars could save one life; a pack of gum equates
to fifty pounds of seed corn somewhere or a
month’s supply of food for an orphaned child.
One small TV equals the price of several llamas,
and money for a typical family vacation could
build three adobe homes for hurricane victims in
Central America (p. 33).
Here Simon’s argument takes an abrupt turn.

Having just endorsed Singer’s moral judgment—
consumption of non-necessities causes deaths and
is no different from murder—he then wishes, in
what seems a very bad case of special pleading, to
affirm the enjoyment of non-necessities by
Christians. “Now that I have spoiled your fun,”
he writes of his presentation of Singer, “let me
add that God wants us to enjoy life, to have good
times, and to spread the table well on special
occasions” (p.133, my italics). What is Simon’s
warrant for this seemingly misplaced assertion? It
is that Jesus enjoyed such things, even permitting
a woman to pour priceless perfume on his head
(p.133).
However, we cannot have Singer’s cake and let
Jesus eat it, too. If we think Singer’s moral judgment on the enjoyment of non-necessities is true,
as Simon does, then we are forced to conclude
(assuming perfect goodness) that God wants us to
do no such thing as “spread the table” and so forth
(or that the “God” who does so, is really not God
at all). Furthermore, if Singer’s words are true,
then, by allowing the woman to pour the perfume
on his head—pure nard, worth a year’s wages—
Jesus did something terribly wicked, for the very
reasons that Judas Iscariot gave: “this ointment
could have been sold for more than three hundred
denarii, and the money given to the poor” (Mk.
14: 5). It follows from Singer’s rule that we must
repudiate the entire Judeo-Christian teaching on
the goodness and blessedness of enjoyment and,
perforce, that we must join Judas in denouncing
the behavior of Christ. Such a necessary response
would be no great consequence to Singer, we suppose, since he is an atheist, but for Christians, it
ought to inspire a searching critique of the rule,
not its casual deployment in Christian service.
Instead, leaving the rule in place, Simon seeks
to temper its prohibitive severity. He does so by
referring readers to the counsel of writer Marva
Dawn, who gives us her permission to engage in
enjoyments, otherwise prohibited, on unique
occasions, such as the Sabbath or “special celebrations” (133). However, this advice is unsatisfactory for at least three reasons.
First, the core assumption of Singer’s rule, now
generally accepted, is that one’s enjoyment is the
efficient cause of human death. Normally, then,
such enjoyment counts as murder. If so, then any
exemption for that judgment would have to take

Pro Rege—March 2005 5

this form: one’s enjoyment—eating at a nice
restaurant on the “special occasion” of my son’s
graduation—is of greater value than the lives that
it terminates. In Christian terms, obviously, this
reasoning is entirely perverse. Its inevitability,
however, on Singer’s rule so modified, proves
that this rule cannot regulate a distinctly
Christian ethic of consumer capitalism. It can
regulate Singer’s naturalistic global ethic for this
simple reason: the elimination of consumer capitalism altogether would cause more human suffering and death than does keeping it in place. In
terms of utility, capitalism, despite the deaths it
causes, is, on the whole, worth that cost, in the
same way that Singer’s endorsed policies of
euthanasia and infanticide are worth the cost—for
the greater good to the most people. However, I
trust it is obvious that this avenue of justification
for capitalism is not open to the Christian.
Second, supposing there could be such exemptions—“teleological suspensions of the ethical,”
so to speak—we would require very clear norms
for knowing when such occasions exist and thus
for discerning between them and the normal circumstances in which enjoyment is an evil. If God
“wants us to spread the table on occasion,” we
must be able to know what sorts of occasion.
Moreover, since human lives are at stake, we can
ill afford to be mistaken. Before we take part in
some pleasurable experience or other, our footing
must be very sure indeed. Otherwise, we play a
morally vicious game of Russian roulette with the
lives of others. I see no available way of achieving that proportionate epistemic clarity, however.
And if the rule of utility holds some of the time,
or perhaps most of the time, so that in those cases
our enjoyments are murderous, then I believe we
reach a moral impasse. Since we cannot know
with appropriate certainty when they are not murderous, the better part of virtue is to play safe and
to live as if the rule holds all the time. That
approach, of course, suggests a counsel of withdrawal and disengagement from the culture of
consumer capitalism.
There is a third reason that the appeal to special
exemptions from Singer’s rule fails. As already
noted, in consumer capitalism the enjoyment of
non-necessities is simply inherent in the culture,
part of its “way of life.” There really is no way
around this existential fact. Anyone who is
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involved in this culture at any level—even college students and professors—simply must take
part in the enjoyment of its affluence. To understand that the enjoyment of affluence is part of
our existential human condition in advanced societies has important implications for our moral
discourse. One such implication is that we see
ourselves more clearly: when we write, preach,
and issue judgments about “the rich,” we are writing, preaching, and making judgments about ourselves. This self-knowledge is the beginning of
humility that is too often lacking in such discourse. Another implication, however, is that the
appeal to special exemption renders the limitation
to “special” occasions useless as long as we participate actively in cultures of capitalism. College
students and professors, for instance, simply by
taking part in the culture in these ways, enjoy a
cornucopia of gratuitous things. We enjoy a campus with its many facilities, offerings of technology, knowledge, skills, and aesthetic pleasures
(such as sporting, music, and theater events). The
list goes on. That we may take all these things for
granted does not change the fact that we are
immersed in excess by any meaningful standard.
To go around in such circumstances preaching the
evil of enjoyment except on occasion is as senseless as condemning one’s fellow swimmers for
being wet.
The serious problem of forging Christian
norms in the context of a general rule of material
utility is manifest in the widely read proposals of
Ronald Sider. Sider clearly understands “simpler
living” as a moral mandate of social justice for all
affluent Christians: “It is not because food,
clothes, wealth, and property are evil that
Christians today must lower their standard of living. It is because others are starving” (Sider,
1997, p.101 [my italics]). In his extensive section
on the biblical prophets, Sider amplifies this
point, issuing this eye-catching judgment: many
rich so-called “Christians” have already reached
the point, in their lifestyles, where their neglect of
the poor is past divine forgiveness (62). Sider
measures this point by their paltry level of charitable giving—about one percent of income.
Later in the book, Sider reaffirms this hellish
threat by citing the words of John Wesley: “Any
‘Christian’ who takes for himself anything more
than the plain necessaries of life, lives in open,

habitual denial of the Lord.” Such a “Christian,”
declared Wesley, “has gained riches and hell fire”
(p.190, my italics). The quote from Wesley makes
clear that he, Wesley, adopted a rule of strict
material utility and that Sider generally approves
of that rule. But like Simon, Sider realizes that
unequivocal endorsement of this rule is incompatible with biblical teaching on the goodness and
blessedness of enjoying creation. In a preceding
section, Sider notes that the tithe of Deuteronomy
14 and the eating and drinking of Jesus represent
an important biblical tradition: “God wants his
people to celebrate the glorious goodness of his
creation,” he writes (p.100).
Like Simon’s moral use of Singer, Sider equivocates on Wesley: “We need not agree with
[Wesley’s] every word to see that he was struggling to follow the biblical summons to share
with the needy” (p.190). Unfortunately, Sider
does not develop a critique or provide a systematic elaboration of what we ought to affirm in
Wesley, besides the obvious point about his struggles (we are all struggling but not in the same
terms). As a result, we are left to piece together
the critique and modifications that Sider seems
tacitly to be making in his use of Wesley’s rule.
Sider’s style of organization makes it difficult
to identify and follow the argument, but there do
seem to be the elements of one. When does our
acquisition and enjoyment count as mortal evil,
cursed and condemned forever by God, and when
is it, on the contrary, a great moral good, blessed
and approved by God? In one place, Sider appeals
to a norm of “sufficiency”: “As John V. Taylor
has pointed out so beautifully, the biblical norm
for material possessions is ‘sufficiency’” (102).
The reference is the famous prayer of Proverbs
30: 8-9—for “neither wealth nor poverty.”
However, what does Sider mean by “sufficient”? Is the meaning “sufficient” for providing
the “plain necessaries of life,” as in Wesley sense,
or “sufficient” in some other sense, for some
other end? It seems that Sider has this second
meaning in mind. After citing Wesley, he writes,
“we should give until our lives truly reflect the
principles of Leviticus 25 and 2 Corinthians 8”
(p.190). When we page back to his discussion of
Leviticus 25, we do find some elaboration of the
norms that we are searching for in the argument.
In explaining the distribution of land after the

exodus, Sider writes that the principle was not
one of strict equality. The divine purpose rather
was that each family had the means they needed
for “a decent life” (p.68). God thereby empowered them to supply “life’s necessities” (p.68).
Here we must take very careful note. Sider
explains: by “necessities” (he puts the term in
quotes), we should not mean “the minimum necessary to keep from starving” (p.69). In Sider’s
terms, the term necessities, rather, means having
the “resources to earn a living that would have
been reasonable and acceptable, not embarrassingly minimal” (p.69, my italics). Sider thus envisions God’s purpose as providing resources “necessary and “sufficient” for being “respected participants in the community” and for acquiring the
“necessities for a decent life” (p.69, my italics).
Unfortunately, the explanation breaks off at this
point, and we are again left to wonder about key
nuances. As noted above, Aquinas, for instance,
developed a similar notion of “necessity” and
elaborated it in terms of what we need in order to
support our station in life, where “stations” can
have a great many different forms, each with its
own norms and requirements. Sider leaves the
impression that his norms for what is “reasonable,” “acceptable,” and “not embarrassingly
minimal” for taking part in “one’s community”
are more or less the same for everyone in economically advanced societies, hence his sweeping judgments about an entire population and its
“lifestyle” rather than a carefully worked out theory of vocation and the variety of norms that
apply to one sort of calling or another. Instead of
such a theory and a variety of norms, he applies
the single norm of charitable giving, understood
generally in terms of the material utilitarian rule
for global ethics.
However, Sider’s norm of relative “sufficiency” cannot work very well under the pressure of
a global utilitarian rule. Consider a man who has
60,000 dollars set aside for purchasing a car.
Having just read Sider’s section on “necessity,”
he is moved to give, say, 10,000 dollars to charities, and with the rest he buys a Lexus (instead of
the Mercedes Benz he had been eying.) In doing
so, he believes he has met Sider’s requirement for
virtue and that he has embarked upon a life of
“simpler living.” Indeed, so he reasons, he has
given a considerable sum to the poor and denied
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himself the Mercedes, but he has deemed the
Lexus (or some comparable car) to be fitting and
in a sense necessary for credible participation in
his “community,” which is that of investment
bankers. Has this man in fact achieved the moral
end of “simpler living”?
His son, who also has read Sider, thinks not. In
an ethics course at college, he has carefully studied the sections on lifestyle, and he is quite sure
that none of the people whom Sider presents as
exemplifying true “simpler living” drive a Lexus.
In the light of Sider’s extensive sections on global poverty, and in view of Sider’s approving use
of Wesley, the son is very sure that Sider would
not approve the father’s actions. Of course Sider
would approve the father’s giving money to the
poor, but as the son sees it, his father has not gone
nearly far enough in reducing his lifestyle. In fact,
his father seems the very sort of person Sider is
engaging and is challenging in the book to repent
and move “from affluence to generosity,” as the
subtitle puts it. In the son’s judgment, his father
could have gotten by very well with a cheaper
car—a Toyota Camry, for instance. At this point,
however, the son’s girlfriend breaks in (they have
driven home for the weekend in the son’s Ford
Escort). In her strong opinion, even the Camry
cannot be justified in a context of global poverty
(I leave ecological issues to the side). She suggests that the father (who by now is trying very
hard to be civil) consider buying a Chevy Malibu
instead, and she goes into great detail on why she
thinks so.
What are we to make of this imaginary conversation? At the very least, it shows how weak a
position the son and his girlfriend are in for making the strong moral judgments they wish to make
on the basis of Sider’s norms. As stated by Sider,
the rule of global material utility does not clarify
our standards for living in advanced cultures. On
the contrary, it reduces them to the relativity of
differing perspectives, preferences, and opinions,
and it thereby encourages “judgmentalism,” as
distinct from keen moral judgment. Moreover, for
participants in consumer capitalism and its existential condition of affluence in a hungry world, it
encourages a most worrisome kind of self-righteousness. For the son and his girlfriend might just
as well be chastised by someone for attending a
private college and driving an unnecessarily
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expensive car—or for attending college or driving any car at all. It is not at all clear in the example that any of the three is in the moral clear, and
Jesus’ words to the Pharisees come to mind:
“Physician, heal thyself!” Instead of issuing confident judgments, they ought to worry about
themselves—in the way that Sider professes to
have worried over the purchase of a new suit,
once, and in the way that Simon professes to have
worried over whether or not to buy floor rugs for
his family’s home.
These worries, pious as they are, merely confirm the moral impasse that strategies of “simpler
living” create for people with a sense of vocation
within cultures of consumer capitalism. A theology of “worry” will hardly sustain our ethics of
vocation and lifestyle under consumer capitalism,
and we shall not find rest in a doctrine of “justification by faith through guilt.” The worry and fear
are legitimate, but they are merely indications of
our pressing need for some alternative formulation of Christian principles.
Metaphysics of Materiality and Extravagance
It should be clear by now that, in my view, a
theology for the engagement of consumer capitalism must achieve two very difficult things at
once. First, resisting immense peer pressure, generated by both Christian tradition and contemporary moral philosophy, it must find a way to
affirm participation in existential conditions of
affluence and the enjoyment of material goods in
the excess (pace Weber). Second, it must do so in
a manner that somehow protects people in these
affluent conditions from the negative force of
arguments based on a rule of global material utility (pace Singer).
In spite of the pressures and difficulties
involved, I have come to believe that sacred
Scripture does provide the fundamental resources
for hammering out just this sort of economic theology. It so happens that moral theorists have
generally neglected the texts that contain this
latent promise. These texts are mainly narratives
of creation and redemption in the Old Testament,
and I suspect that their general neglect by
Christian interpreters has something to do with
the influence of Platonic metaphysics on the
ancient and medieval teaching of the church on
matters having to do with physical aesthetics. Our

theology and ethic of economic life are, in their
metaphysics and existential vision of life, more
Greek than they are Hebrew. In this space I will
confine my comments mainly to the narratives of
creation in the book of Genesis and to the narratives and teachings that are linked to the events of
the exodus.
My argument is that these texts enshrine a very
strong, normative metaphysics of materiality and
the goodness of extravagance, enjoyed in the
right way. In fact, the vision of human existence
as it should be is not that of temperance, as classically understood. It is that of delight in divinely
given excess, an eschatology that is sometimes
realized in this life by means of calling into the
“scandalous particularity” of divine redemptive
actions.
To begin with Genesis, we find in this account
that the creator does not bring forth just a material order, or cosmos. He creates a material order of
remarkable intricacy, variety, interest, and aesthetic delights that are quite superfluous to its
mere cosmic function. In her diary, Pilgrim at
Tinker Creek, Annie Dillard eloquently captures
this metaphysics of extravagance in her own
observations of nature: “After one extravagant
gesture of creation in the first place, the universe
has continued to deal exclusively in extravagances, flinging intricacies and colossi down
aeons of emptiness, heaping profusions on profligacies with ever fresh vigor” (Dillard, 1998
[1974]). In both its poetic form and language,
Genesis 1 conveys this powerful sense of the
extravagance of God the creator.
This religious metaphysics of the goodness of
creation in its materiality and cosmic extravagance extends throughout the Old Testament and
also into the New. Perhaps its most visible and
theologically fundamental appearance is in the
narrative of God creating human beings in the
divine image and likeness. In Genesis 2, as we
have learned from recent scholarship, the phrase
“image of God” is an idiom for one who possesses divinely conferred royal status (Middleton,
1994, pp.11-12). Unlike the gods of other ancient
cultures of the Near East, the God of the Hebrews
gave this status of dignity and dominion not to
just one person—the ruling monarch—but to all
human beings, both male and female. This was a
“democratic” revolution in the religious meta-

physics of the Near East (and the world). More
directly related to our inquiry, God, in doing so,
did not merely create human beings and give
them a job to do; rather, he blessed human beings
by placing them in conditions of extraordinary
material extravagance, designed to make possible
for them an existence of supreme delight. God
placed them in a royal Garden, ordered them to
“till” and to “keep” it, to be sure, but also gave
them loving permission to eat freely of its
fruits—all save one, of course. If there is any single place in sacred Scripture where we have the
divine vision of human existence as it should be,
it is in this narrative of Eden (and not, say, in the
petition of Proverbs 30: 8-9.) It is a vision of
unashamed material extravagance put in the existential form of delight. (We shall deal with rebellion and the “fall” in just a moment.)
Redemption as “Realized Eschatology”
The vision of material extravagance, formed
existentially into delight, is at the core of biblical
eschatology and the vision of sacred Scripture for
the end of human history after the Day of
Judgment. Very briefly, in later, advanced Old
Testament tradition, the promise is that God will
remake heaven and earth, so that human identity
and society will continue, only in perfected
form—as a divinely ordered kingdom (Isaiah 65:
17; 66: 22-23). This will be a realm in which evil
things will be recalled no more, a place of rejoicing and gladness for both people and God (Isaiah
65: 17-19). Furthermore the quality of experience
will be that of material delight, unashamed—fine
houses, vineyards, enjoyment of fruitful work,
harmony between creatures of the wild, no more
pain, and no more death (Isaiah 65: 20-25). This
is a vision of material extravagance formed into
joy and delight on all levels. Perhaps the most
vivid expression for individuals is that of Micah,
which holds forth God’s promise to the faithful
that one day, after the nations have beaten their
swords into plowshares, “they shall all sit under
their own vines and under their own fig trees”
(Micah 4: 3-4; also Zech. 3: 10).
This eschatological vision carries over directly
into that of the New Testament, in which Jesus
describes the kingdom as a Messianic Feast (what
Richard Mouw recently called, in a speech at
Calvin College, “a great cholesterol-free binge.”)
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And it reaches its height in the book of
Revelation, which depicts the life to come as a
city brimming with wealth—a city of jasper, gold,
sapphires, emerald, onyx, and so forth (Rev. 2021). In both testaments, the imagery is no doubt
symbolic and difficult to interpret in detail.
However, the general affirmations of materiality
formed in extravagance for delight are clear
enough—there is very little Greek ontology of
moderation or temperance here.
These visions of the beginning and the end are
crucial to understanding biblical narratives of
redemption. For in biblical thought, redemption
in its complete form always is the making actual
of the divine purpose in creation, and thus it is
what C. H. Dodd, in a different context
(Christology), labeled “realized eschatology.” In
Scripture, divine acts of redemption “realize,” at
least dimly, the same quality of existence that is
in store for history’s end. The account of the exodus is a narrative of eschatology thus “realized”
by acts of God. He does not merely redeem the
Hebrews from oppression but also creates for
them a place of unimagined material extravagance and delight. Just as in the “eating and
drinking” of Jesus in the New Testament, which
enacted in space and time the great Messianic
Feast that is to come, the Promised Land is a
miraculous incarnation of the world’s future. In
addition to its other implications for theology, this
understanding of redemption is very important to
our theology of economic life.
Called into Affluence and “Virtue Ethic”
One implication that has gone almost completely unnoticed in the literature is the notion of
calling that emerges in the narrative and in the
other texts linked with the exodus. In this narrative, as in Eden, God calls his people to represent
him in blessed conditions of material extravagance. The idea that God is free sometimes to
“realize” his purpose in this way is firmly secured
in Old Testament religion. We notice that God is
not bound to do so—not in a broken world, anyway. As Doug Schuurmann has so very well
observed in his recent book on vocation, divine
callings have many social and economic shapes
and sizes, contingent on the wisdom and will of
God (Schuurman, 2004). My point simply is that
these texts (and there are many others, too) prove
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that God sometimes has called people into circumstances of considerable affluence, and that he
has done so with very deep creative and redemptive purposes. At once, the people of the exodus
are supposed to enjoy, reveal, and bring forth a
quality of life that is good, even in a fallen world.
In all those senses they are supposed to be a light
to a darkened earth.
But how are they supposed to go about this
“paradigmatic” sort of existence? How are they
supposed to embrace their calling into affluence
so as to make of it a good and to prevent it from
becoming evil? The texts of the exodus give
answers to this question—they give extensive,
connected teaching for people called into conditions of abundance. Since they do, it seems reasonable to think that these texts may be quite
indispensable to people in our own day and age,
as I believe they are. For if it is true that God has
called many North Americans to represent him in
and through circumstances of material abundance
(not in spite of them), then the teachings linked
with these narratives of the exodus are as relevant
to our question as they could be.
The clearest, condensed summary of such
instruction is nested in the speeches of Moses in
the book of Deuteronomy, particularly in chapter
eight. In this finely stylized speech, “Moses”
relates their recent experience in Edenic terms.
The hard, meager years in the wilderness were
not the norm but rather a test and a means of
teaching God’s people both faith and fear of the
Lord. Now, however, God has brought them into
a rich land, where they will “multiply” and which
they will “fill” (Deut. 8: 1). It is a “good” land, “a
land with flowing streams, with springs and
underground waters welling up in valleys and
hills.” Like Eden, it is fruitful, “a land of wheat
and barley, of vines and fig trees and pomegranates, a land of olive trees and honey” (Deut. 8: 78). In this land they will “lack nothing,” including
precious elements of iron and copper (Deut. 8: 9).
In this land, “you shall eat your fill and bless the
Lord your God for the good land that he has given
you” (Deut. 8: 10).
However, with these words, the speaker has not
finished (as proponents of the “prosperity
Gospel” lead one to think). The speaker has just
begun. Like Eden, the Promised Land—both
brought forth directly by God—is as dangerous as

it is blessed and good. It is a deep mystery: the
creation of human freedom in circumstances of
material extravagance comes inevitably with
great, deadly risk. Nevertheless, as with Eden, the
Promised Land is a real ontological good. But to
enjoy this good properly, the people must deliberately cultivate virtue, both personal and social. If
they fail as Adam and Eve failed in Eden, they
will inevitably fall into vice. They will pervert
what is good into evil, and they will do so to their
own destruction.
What are the virtues? What sort of covenant
with God exists? What norms are supposed to
regulate their economic life in these privileged
circumstances? It is notable that the initial stress,
however, is not on the social virtue of justice nor
on the personal virtue of temperance. Both
Genesis 2-3 and Deuteronomy 8 initially stress
the virtue of memory. And right memory, they
suggest, is the source of twin virtues that are fundamental to the lives of people seeking God amid
abundance. The virtues are gratitude and humility. There is no space to comment extensively on
the idiom of Genesis 2-3, “to be like God, knowing good and evil.” Suffice it to say that the idea
is more or less the same as it is in the (to us) clearer language of Deuteronomy: “Take care that you
do not forget the Lord your God” (Deut. 8: 11, my
italics).
What are they supposed to remember, and
how? The text makes clear that forgetting refers
to right memory of the acts of God, “who brought
you up out of Egypt, out of the house of slavery”
(Deut. 8: 14). These gracious redemptive actions
narrate the identity of God in all his grace and
power. Moreover, they narrate the true identity of
his people in all their undeserving weakness. To
forget these redemptive actions thus leads
inevitably to fundamental vice for the affluent:
“When you have eaten your fill and have built
fine houses and live in them, and when your herds
and flocks have multiplied, and your silver and
gold is multiplied, and all that you have is multiplied, then do not exalt yourself” (Deut. 8: 12-13,
my italics). They dare not even whisper to themselves, “‘My power and the might of my own
hand have gotten me this wealth’” (Deut. 8: 17).
For when they do so, they will inevitably turn to
other gods—the quintessence of self-worship.
And so corrupted, they will perish from the earth:

“Like the nations that the Lord is destroying
before you, so shall you perish, because you
would not obey the voice of the Lord your God”
(Deut. 8: 20).
In the slippery business of “ranking the
virtues,” as Aquinas rightly knew was needful,
the virtue of right memory is the foundation for
key moral qualities of humility before God,
remembered for his redemptive acts, and the
virtue of gratitude for what he has done. When
this cluster of virtuous affections obtains, others
must follow, as they do in various teachings of the
Pentateuch, Wisdom literature, and the Prophets.
Memory of this kind cannot help but produce the
disposition of love for God and his gifts and also
compassion and desire for justice in the lives of
others, especially the poor and powerless, which
is the constant theme of this literature.
So far, it seems very clear—at least in the Old
Testament—that the enjoyment of material abundance can be a good, as long as one cultivates the
core virtues of memory, humility, and gratitude
before God. Love of God cannot help but give
forth love of neighbor. Since this affirmation is
anchored in the religious metaphysics of biblical
religion and in the metaphysics of biblical eschatology, it would be very strange to think that a
similar sort of divine calling is impossible for the
New Testament Christian. Denial of this possibility would surely entail some form of Gnosticism.
However, here rises a vexing question. In view of
common intuitions about material utility, how can
people enjoy abundance amid poverty and at the
same time cultivate the virtue of social justice?
The “Scandal of Particularity” and
Economic Life
I believe that the narratives of Eden, the exodus, etc.—not least the narratives of the
Incarnation of Christ in the New Testament—do
give forth an answer that is relevant to Christian
vocation in our day. It is linked (so I believe) with
what Kierkegaard famously named (in reference
to Christ’s Incarnation) the “scandal of particularity.” Christian theologians have for a long time
understood its “scandalousness” and the momentous difficulties it creates for Christian doctrines
of divine revelation and redemption—especially
now in a global age. But I am not aware of anyone who has discussed its importance to our
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ethics of vocation and lifestyle under capitalism.
To begin, in his book on vocation, Doug
Schuurman endorses versions of Luther’s,
Calvin’s, and Ian Ramsey’s objection to Tolstoy’s
and John Yoder’s sort of judgment that giving
privileged treatment to oneself and to others, with
whom one is in a special relationship (such as
one’s wife and children, or students, or employees), is morally wrong (Schuurman, 2004, pp. 90101). Tolstoy and Yoder allow no such gradations
of strength in obligation. In Schuurman’s words,
paraphrasing Ramsey, this judgment gives us our
moral obligations for love and justice “in a constant, unordered… scattershot” (p. 93). This is
Singer’s view of course, and it was also Wesley’s,
and defenders of “simpler living” provide no
explicit defense against its consequence: no
enjoyment of abundance can be a moral good as
long as poverty exists within our redemptive
reach.
To adopt this view, however, requires a serious
rewriting of Old Testament tradition and must
also contend with the theme of Messianic celebration in the narratives of Christ. However, putting aside exegetical arguments that I have given
elsewhere on the Gospels (Schneider, 2002), I
find this rewriting implausible for two reasons.
First, it requires reworking the metaphysics of
materiality and extravagance threaded into the
fabric of biblical doctrines of creation and
redemption as “realized eschatology.” This
reworking is, of course, the sort of biblical criticism employed by the ancient Gnostics, who took
anti-materialism all the way through to the incarnation and resurrection of Christ. Second, the Old
Testament writers were well aware that their
counsel of virtuous enjoyment was for people
coexisting with victims of poverty. In fact, a part
of virtue for wealthy people was moral sensitivity to this existential fact. The speaker of
Deuteronomy, who has just described the virtues
of delight, now explains the virtue of generosity:
“Since there will never cease to be some in need
on earth, I therefore command you, ‘Open your
hand to the poor and needy neighbor in your
land’” (Deut. 15: 11). Obviously, the speaker
believed that the first virtues were compatible
with the second.
How so? How is it that we might resist the
moral logic of Singer and others without a trans-
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parently self-serving rationale? In other words,
how might the biblical eschatology be “realized”
in a fallen world, in which we always have the
poor with us? I believe that the explanation lies in
how God is supposed to have realized it and in
how God may realize it in our day. In biblical narratives, God realizes his vision for human beings
by means of an astonishing particularity of field
in action.
Consider the key instances: Eden, Noah,
Abraham, the Promised Land, the Incarnation of
Christ in Israel, and the birth and growth of the
Church. In each instance, God creates an intensely concentrated, limited field of redemptive
action. He does not save the world in a utilitarian
scattershot. He does so in the manner of an artist,
one careful step at a time. Of course these actions
are universal, aimed at the eventual realization of
delight for the entire world. However, God
achieves this universality by means of particularity.
God does not call people to universal fields of
action—doing so would violate their nature as
finite creatures. God calls them into particular
fields of redemption to take their particular parts
in God’s redemptive work. One implication—
“scandalous” though it may seem to the modern
pragmatic mind—is that the particularity of one’s
calling brings forth an epistemic clarity of obligation, so that we may avoid the moral impasse of
“simpler living,” as just considered. Even a
superficial reading of the laws shows that
Israelites were primarily responsible for their
moral treatment inside the land rather than outside it. The same is obviously true of Jesus, called
first to the Jews and to the early Christians, whose
first obligations were to fellow Christians.
John Ryan understood this biblical configuration of ethics in terms of the Catholic principle of
subsidiarity, which states that our first obligations are to meet the challenges nearest by. To
paraphrase former House Speaker “Tip” O’Neill,
who made the famous comment that “all politics
is local,” we might say that for the biblical
Christian, all ethics is essentially “local,” too. Our
first obligations are the ones most tightly linked
with our particular fields of calling (Hinze, 2004,
pp.169-70).
There is powerful support for this principle of
“moral proximity” in historic Christian teaching.

Aquinas, for instance, wrote this: “Since you cannot do good to everybody, first care for those who
by chance of place or time or any other circumstances are closest to you” (Aquinas, 1997 [II. 30.
3]). Jonathan Edwards wrote derisively of those
“Pharisees” who undertake “great things” but
neglect the people nearest them (Schuurman,
2004, p. 94). Edwards worked out a principle for
ranking obligations very similar to the one I have
called “moral proximity,” which simply means
that social moral obligations are strongest in proportion to their nearness to our first calling, such
as to be a good husband, wife, or parent (p. 95;
Schneider, 2002, pp. 172-182). Likewise, commenting on the parable of the Good Samaritan,
John Calvin wrote, “the more closely a man is
linked to us, the more intimate obligation we have
to assist him” (Schuurman, 2004, p. 95).
Like Aquinas, Calvin understood that this rule
of obligation is inherent in human society itself:
“It is common habit of mankind that the more
close men are bound together by the ties of kinship, of acquaintanceship, or of neighborhood,
the more responsibilities for one another they
share” (p. 95). Annie Dillard understands it that
way too. She suggests that the famous “scandal of
particularity” in Christ’s incarnation is not really
a scandal at all. “Well, ‘the scandal of particularity,’” she writes, “is the only world that I know.
We’re all up to our necks in this particular scandal” (Dillard, 1974 [1998], p. 81). As Schuurman
puts it, the principle of descending strength of
obligation is essential to humility, for we are
finite creatures, not gods (p. 96).
However, if it is possible—on cultivation of
right memory, love, and justice primarily within
one’s field of calling—both to enjoy material
abundance and to meet the demands of social
virtue, what about the matter of global poverty?
Let me finish the essay with these all too brief
comments.
First, given the innumerable kinds of callings
that I believe are possible for Christians in the
world of modern capitalism, and the innumerably
varied obligations of lifestyle proper to them, I do
not think it is wise to prescribe formulas that are
supposed to apply to every rich Christian living
in an age of hunger. However, I do believe that
globalization does generate obligations of some
kind and of some strength for Christians in these

privileged societal circumstances. But what kind
are they, and of what strength?
Instead of a mandate of material utility, I propose that we apply a mandate of vocation to this
complex matter. I propose that we begin, not by
quantifying amounts or formulating our question
in terms of “how much is enough” and so forth,
but that we begin by reflecting on who we are
supposed to be. We will make a great deal more
progress by focusing on what God is calling us to
do and thus on what virtue means in respect to
that particular calling. Our sense of global calling
ought not be “scattershot” but should rather fit
naturally into the fabric of our primary calling—
to be a meatpacker in Sioux Center, Iowa, for
instance, or an executive for a company that produces, markets, and distributes something as
superfluous as cell phone service. We cannot
know in advance what this global connection will
be, for we must look to find it and to see what it
might be. Whatever it is, it ought not disrupt or
damage our ability to carry out our first calling.
(Of course it is possible, as it was for the
Apostles, that one’s first calling turns out to be a
global mission; nevertheless, it will still be a particular mission, not to the “world” but to some
place and to some particular people or other.) In
other words, for most, the matter of global obligations is entirely contingent on our epistemology
of divine calling. (I recommend Schuurman’s
book on vocation for a good start towards wisdom in pursuit of such self-knowledge.)
Conclusion: Nothing Vain
I conclude with brief comments on an intriguing but little-noticed proposal made by Miraslov
Volf. In countering the judgment of Weber on
capitalism as an “iron cage” (so translated), Volf
proposed (and in intriguing contrast to Augustine
and the majority of moral theologians, I think)
that what confers goodness on enjoyments is their
participation in eternity. In his words, “The realm
of freedom is an eschatological vision of the good
life. This vision is the broadest framework in
which we ought to place the creation of wealth
and the dynamic satisfaction of needs for external
goods” (Volf, 1995, p. 189). This idea needs to be
explored. While on one level it is true that our
work in this world is passing vanity (so
Ecclesiastes), in God nothing is vain. On the con-
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trary, “when we turn to God, we find that same
[otherwise lost] world sanctified and glorified in
God. In God, in whom nothing worth preserving
is lost, everything worth enjoying can be
enjoyed” (p.191).
Right memory and a sense of calling will go a
long way in helping us each of us know what
things they are, what things they are not, and how
to do our small part in the larger redemptive
engagement of consumer capitalism. Let us not
fear for Christianity’s capacity to do so.
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